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This paper empirically analyzes the inﬂuence of the distribution of education on democracy
by controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and by taking into account the persistency of
some of the variables. The most novel ﬁnding is that increase in the education attained by
the majority of the population is what matters for the implementation and sustainability of
democracy, rather than the average years of schooling. We show this result is robust to issues
pertaining omitted variables, outliers, sample selection, or a narrow deﬁnition of the variables
used to measure democracy.
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I Introduction
A quick glance at the initial years of schooling and subsequent political regimes across-countries
strongly support Lipset´s (1959) hypothesis that high educational standards are one of the basic
conditions sustaining a democracy. For instance, all the countries with an average of at least 4
years of schooling in 1960 are nowadays stable democracies, whereas the countries with less that 1
year of education in 1960 remained authoritarian regimes during the period 1960-2000. This simple
observation in favour of the so called modernization theory has been corroborated by thorough
empirical evidence (e.g. Barro, 1999, and Glaeser et al., 2004).
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1However, recently Acemoglu et al. (2005) have challenged the Lipset´s hypothesis. These
authors point out that previous cross-country estimations that ﬁnd a positive correlation between
education and democracy could be biased due to a problem of omitted variables. In fact, when
they estimate a dynamic panel data model that controls for country speciﬁce ﬀects and analyze the
relationship between education and democracy within a country, the authors ﬁnd no relationship
b e t w e e na ni n c r e a s ei ne d u c a t i o na n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h el e v e lo fd e m o c r a c y . 1
In this paper we provide empirical support for Lipset´s views even taking into account unob-
servable heterogeneity. Mainly, we depart from the previous literature in two ways. Firstly, we
state that it is the education attained by the majority of the society that should be relevant for the
implementation and sustainability of democracies across and within a country. That is, in order to
proxy for the education attained by the median voter it seems more appropriate to use a measure
of the distribution of education rather than a measure of the average years of schooling. In fact,
an increase in the average years of schooling could be driven by an increase in the education at-
tained by a minority elite, which might not encourage a democratic regime. However, the previous
empirical literature that has analyzed the eﬀect of education on democracy has not taken into
account distributional issues. In this paper we state that the distribution of education is relevant
in the determination of a democratic regime. In fact, we ﬁnd the empirical regularity that more
than an increase in the average years of schooling, it is an increase in the education attained by
the majority of the population that matters for democracy. In this line, some recent developments
in the political economy literature have also introduced inequality as the new key dimension in
the theoretical models (e.g. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2001), Boix and Garicano (2002)).
However, most of these models focus on the distribution of income and wealth while our approach
is enterely related to the distribution of education.
Secondly, from a methodological point of view, we use the system GMM estimator, which
has been proved to perform better than the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator in Monte Carlo simulations
when variables are highly persistent (see Blundell and Bond, 1998). As is well known, ﬁxed eﬀect
and ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimators, used by Acemoglu et al. (2005), exploit the within country
variation in the data. Nevertheless, these techniques might not be appropriate when variables are
highly persistent over time, as is the case of democracy and educational measures. For instance, 36
out of 104 countries in the sample display the same value in the political rights index in 1970 and in
2000, which implies that the variation in democracy during this period is null for these countries.
In the case of education, the characteristic of persistency is also relevant. Table 1 shows that more
than 85 per cent of the variation in education is cross-sectional, whereas the explanatory power
of time dummies in a regression where the dependent variable is the average years of schooling is
less than 1 per cent. Therefore, an econometric technique that exploits the bulk of the variation
in the data would be preferable in order to improve the precision of the estimated coeﬃcients. By
adding the original equation in levels to a system of equations that also includes equations in ﬁrst
1Even though Glaeser et al. (2004) also ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of increments in schooling on increments in
democracy and other political institutions, Acemoglu et al. (2005) show that this result is driven by the omission
of time eﬀects in the regressions.
2diﬀerences, the system GMM estimator is particularly useful in our context since, in addition to
controlling for country-speciﬁce ﬀects, it preserves the cross-country dimension of the data that is
lost when only the ﬁrst diﬀerenced equation is estimated.
[Insert Table 1]
For a sample of 104 countries during the period 1960-2000, our results imply that rather than an
increase in the average years of education, what really matters for democracy is an improvement in
the education attained by the majority of the society. This ﬁnding is in line with Lipset´s view, who
states that “education presumably broadens men´s outlooks, enables them to understand the need for
norms of tolerance, restrains them from adhering to extremist and monistic doctrines, and increases
their capacity to make rational electoral choices. (1959, p. 79)” Therefore, if formal education
provides political attitudes conducive to democracy, the likelihood of a country establishing and
maintaining a democratic regime will be higher the larger the educated population in the society.
We show the results are robust to an array of sensitivity tests. Firstly, we analyze the rela-
tionship between education and democracy in diﬀerent samples that include developing as well as
advanced economies and in a sample that excludes oil exporting countries. Secondly, we control
for a broad number of variables that have been found in the literature to be relevant for democ-
racies (e.g. Barro, 1999). Thirdly, we control for time invariant variables that proxy for earlier
institutions (see Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004). Fourthly, we complement the analysis by using
the measures of democracy and institutions suggested by Glaeser et al. (2004) and alternative
measures of education inequality computed by Castelló and Doménech (2002). Finally, we check
the robustness of the results to the presence of atypical observations. In all exercises we ﬁnd
that an increase in the amount of education attained by the majority of the population stimulates
democracy.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The next section describes the data and the
econometric technique used. Section III presents the main result of the paper which states a positive
relationship between a more equal distribution of education and the level of democracy. Section
IV examines the robustness of this result. Finally, the last section summarizes the conclusions
reached.
II Model and Data
II. I The Econometric Model
As proposed by Acemolgu et al. (2005), this paper analyzes the relationship between education
and democracy by estimating the following dynamic model:
Democracyi,t = βDemocracyi,t−τ + γEducationi,t−τ + αi + ξt + εi,t (1)
3where i is the country, t is the period and τ is the time lag. The variable Democracy lagged
τ periods enters the set of explanatory variables to capture the characteristic of persistency in
democracies. The coeﬃcient of interest is γ,w h i c hr e ﬂects whether Education has any eﬀect on
democracies. The measure of education will include the level of education as well as its distribution.
We also control for time, ξt, and country speciﬁce ﬀects, αi. Therefore, the advantage of estimating
a panel model is that we can control for unobservable variables that are country speciﬁca n dw h o s e
omission-e.g. in a pure cross-sectional regression- may bias the estimated coeﬃcients.
The most common approach to estimate a dynamic panel data model has been the ﬁrst diﬀer-
ence Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).
The idea of this estimator is to take ﬁrst diﬀerences to eliminate the source of inconsistency, that is
αi, and use the levels of the explanatory variables lagged two and further periods as instruments.
In order for the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator to be consistent we need to assume that the errors
are not second order serially correlated and that the explanatory variables are weakly exogenous.
If these assumptions hold we can use the following moment conditions:
E[(εi,t − εi,t−τ)Wi,t−sτ]=0with s ≥ 2 (2)
where W =[ Democracy Education]. However, although the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator
deals properly with the problem of unobservable heterogeneity, it has some shortcomings in the
estimation of equation (1). The ﬁrst has to be with the characteristic of persistency of the variables
included in this equation. These variables, particularly educational measures, vary signiﬁcantly
across countries but remain quite stable within a country. Thus, by taking ﬁrst diﬀerences most
of the variation in the data, which comes from variability across countries, disappears. This fact
may indeed increase the measurement error bias by increasing the variance of the measurement
error relative to the variance of the true signal (Griliches and Hausman, 1986). Moreover, Blundell
and Bond (1998) point out that when explanatory variables are persistent, the lagged levels of
the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables in diﬀerences. They show that in
small samples the shortcomings of weak instruments translate into a large ﬁnite sample bias.
We can partially solve these problems by estimating a system of equations that includes equa-
tions in diﬀerences as well as equations in levels. By including a regression in levels the system
GMM estimator, proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), incor-
porates the cross-country variation of our data. In the system GMM estimator the equations in
ﬁrst diﬀerences eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀect in the model. Moreover, the diﬀerence equations are
combined with equations in levels, which are instrumented with the lagged ﬁrst diﬀerences of the
corresponding explanatory variables. In order to use these additional instruments, we need the
identifying assumption that the ﬁrst diﬀerences of the explanatory variables are not correlated
with the speciﬁce ﬀect, that is, although the speciﬁce ﬀect may be correlated to the explanatory
variables, the correlation is supposed to be constant over time. Therefore, the additional moment
conditions for the equation in levels are:
4E[∆Wi,t−τ(αi + εi,t )] = 0 (3)
If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in Monte Carlo simu-
lations the system GMM estimator performs better than the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator. We
can test the validity of the moment conditions by using the conventional test of overidentifying
restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958) and Hansen (1982) and by testing the null hypothesis that
the error term is not second order serially correlated. Furthermore, we test the validity of the
additional moment conditions associated with the level equation with the diﬀerence Hansen test.
II. II The Data
The most common measure of democracy used in the literature is the Freedom House Political
Rights Index. The Freedom House measures freedom through the political rights and the civil
liberties indexes. These variables range from 1 to 7, indicating more freedom the closer the value
is to 1. These measures are available for several countries from 1972 to 2003. In line with Barro
(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2005) we complement these measures with the related variables from
Bollen (1990) for the years 1960 and 1965 and normalize the variables to range from 0 to 1, where
the greater the value the more democratic a set of institutions is.2
The measures of education include the average years of education of the population 25 years
and over from Barro and Lee (2001). The human capital Gini coeﬃcient and the distribution
of educations by quintiles is computed by Castelló and Domémech (2002). The time span is a
ﬁve-year panel from 1960 to 2000.
III Education and Democracy
Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1) under diﬀerent assumptions regarding
the error term. In all equations we measure education with the average years of education in the
population 25 years and over (Average Educ) and with a measure of equality in the distribution of
education, which calculates the percentage of education attained by sixty per cent of the population
(3rd Quintile Educ). The measure of democracy in all equations is the political rights index.
Column (1) shows the results in the existing literature that do not control for country speciﬁc
eﬀects, that is, the estimated equation assumes that αi =0 . In line with the previous ﬁnd-
ings, results show that the correlation between the average years of schooling and the measure
of democracy is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that more education is related to
more democracy. We obtain similar results if we check the modernization theory by measuring
education with the third quintile (column (2)). Furthermore, we can calculate the “steady state”
eﬀect as γ/(1 − β), to compute the long run eﬀect, if causal, from education to democracy. The
estimated values of the parameter imply that an increase in one standard deviation in the years
2We use the data from the Freedom House in 1972 for the year 1970.
5of education (about 2.9 years) would increase the long run value of democracy by 0.22. In the
case of the third quintile the magnitude of the eﬀect is quite similar to the average eﬀect; a one
standard deviation increase in the third quintile (0.19) is estimated to increase the long term value
of democracy by 0.22 ((0.352/(1-0.698)*0.19)). The results, however, diﬀer when both variables
are included in the set of controls. In that case, the estimated coeﬃcient and signiﬁcance of the
average years of education decreases substantially, while the quantitative eﬀect of the third quintile
on democracy remains sizeable.
In line with the results of Acemoglu et al. (2005), column (4) shows that the positive association
between education and democracy disappears once we control for country speciﬁc-eﬀects (αi 6=0 ).
In view of these results, Acemoglu et al. (2005) conclude that “this strongly suggests that the cross-
sectional relationship between education and democracy is driven by omitted factors inﬂuencing both
education and democracy rather than a causal relationship (p. 48)”.3
Nevertheless, as stressed above, the characteristic of persistency in the explanatory variables
may cause several biases in the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM estimator. The ﬁrst is the potential mea-
surement error bias since ﬁrst diﬀerences may increase the variance of the noise to the true signal
ratio. The second is related to the problem of weak instruments, biasing the ﬁrst diﬀerence GMM
estimator towards the ﬁxed eﬀect counterpart.4 Hence, in order to address these shortcomings we
can use an alternative estimator that reduces the potential biases and imprecision associated with
the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimator. In fact, when we control for country speciﬁce ﬀects and take into
account the cross-country variation in the data the results are akin to those obtained by Barro
(1999), Glaeser et al. (2004, 2005) and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005), who provide evidence
of a positive impact of education on democracy. As shown in columns (7-8), the coeﬃcient of the
average years of education is positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and the same is
true for the distribution of education. However, when both measures are included in the regression
(column (9)), while the coeﬃcient of the average years of education drops markedly and is no
longer statistically signiﬁcant, the coeﬃcient of equality in the distribution of education changes
only slightly.
The reliability of the results depend on the validity of the instruments. We report the diagnostic
tests at the bottom of the table. The p-values of the AR (2) test give the probability of correctly
rejecting the null hypothesis of no second order serial correlation. The Hansen J test validates
the adequacy of the instruments, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of the
instruments indicates that the speciﬁcation is correct. The Diﬀerence Hansen test evaluates the
validity of the additional orthogonality condition in the system GMM. As displayed at the bottom
of Table 2, the values of the diagnostic tests suggest that the instruments are valid.
In sum, this preliminary evidence directs our attention to the education attained by the majority
3The ﬁxed eﬀect estimator, which also removes the cross-country variation in the data, displays similar results
(not shown). However, this estimator is only consistent under the assumption of strict exogeneity, which does not
hold in a dynamic panel data model since E[Democracyi,t−τ εi,t−τ 6=0 ] .
4Bobba and Coviello (2006) also highlights the problem of weak instruments and weak identiﬁcation in Ace-
moglu´s et al. (2005) results.
6of the society as the relevant educational variable that stimulates democracy.5
[Insert Table 2]
IV Robustness of the Results
The evidence found in the previous section reveals two novel ﬁndings. The ﬁrst shows that even
when controlling for ﬁxed omitted variables, more education is related to a greater degree of
democracy. The second leads to the suggestion that a more equal distribution of education is the
relevant educational variable determining democracy. In this section we study the robustness of
the aforementioned results.
IV. I Diﬀerent samples
Table 3 displays the results when we estimate equation (1) for diﬀerent samples. In the ﬁrst
place, we analyze whether or not the relationship between education and democracy depends on
the level of development (columns (1)-(6)). The results show that in developing countries as well
as advanced economies the educational variable that seems to be relevant for democracy is the
education attained by the majority of the society. However, the positive association between
a better distribution of education and democracy is stronger in developing countries with an
estimated coeﬃcient of 0.521 compared to 0.153 in developed societies.
Secondly, in the last three columns we exclude oil exporting countries since the impact of devel-
opment on democracy in these economies may be through a channel other than the accumulation of
human and physical capital.6 In fact, in most of these countries the level of education is quite low
and the degree of inequality in the distribution of education is quite high. Moreover, considering
5We have also checked the long run eﬀect of education on democracy across countries. The reason is that William
R. Hauk and Romain Wacziarg (2004) analyze the bias properties of diﬀerent estimators in Monte Carlo simulations
for growth regressions. Their ﬁndings suggest that the estimator that performs best when measurement error and
country speciﬃce ﬀects are accounted for is the OLS estimator applied to a cross-section with variables averaged
over the period (between estimator). The results with the variables averaged over the period 1970-2000 is as follows:
Democracyi,1970−2000 =0 .165 + 0.461 Democracyi,1970 +0 .005 Hi,1970−2000 +0 .653 3rdQintileHi,1970−2000
(0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.19)
where Nob=100, R2=0.812 and the standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
I nl i n ew i t ht h ep r e c e d i n gr e s u l t s ,t h ev a r i a b l et h a ts e e m st ob er e l e v a n tf o rt h ed e g r e eo fd e m o c r a c yi st h e
education attained by 60 per cent of the population. Moreover, the quantitative eﬀect of the distribution of
education on democracy with the between estimator is even greater than that found with the system-GMM. The
result holds if we control for per capita income and for regional dummies and if we measure the average years of
education (H ) and the percentage of education attained by sixty per cent of the population (3 rdQuintileH)a tt h e
begining of the period to reduce endogeneity problems.
6Oil exporters include Algeria, Cameroon, Congo, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bahrain,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq and Kuwait.
7that many oil exporting countries have not become democracies, these countries could possibly be
inﬂuencing our results. In columns (7-9) we eliminate the oil exporting countries from the sample.
The results suggest that our previous ﬁndings were not driven by the speciﬁc characteristics of
these economies; the estimated coeﬃcient of the third quintile is always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant.
[Insert Table 3]
IV. II Omitted variables
Next we check the robustness of the results to diﬀerent controls. This exercise is important because
if other variables that aﬀect democracy and are related to education are omitted in the analysis,
the estimated coeﬃcient of the education variables could be biased. Therefore, we should control
for additional explanatory variables that could be potential determinants of democracy.
In Table 3 we control for a broad range of potential determinants of democracy that have been
suggested by the existing literature. The additional controls are added one at a time and enter
the equation lagged one period. To save space we only show the estimated coeﬃcients of the
third quintile.7 Democracy is measured through the political rights index and we also check the
robustness of the results using the civil liberties index. The additional controls include the log of
per capita income since income is the other important variable-apart from education- suggested by
the modernization hypothesis to be highly related to democracy; the log of the investment share
of GDP; the urbanization rate since the European democratization process in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century has been argued to be inﬂuenced by the industrial revolution and the sub-
sequent urbanization; a measure of the country size such as the level of population; two health
indicators measured through the log of life expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate as
additional proxies for the standards of living; the gap between male and female schooling measured
through the average years of primary education for the population aged 25 years and over, as
suggested by Barro (1999); a measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization since more heterogeneity
in the population may be a handicap to sustain a democracy and the percentage of Muslims in the
society given that previous researchers have found a negative correlation between Muslim countries
and democracy.8
The results suggest that controlling for any of these potential determinants of democracies
does not change the main result of the paper. In all cases, the coeﬃcient of the third quintile in
the distribution of education remains positive and statistically signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms that the
7When we include both, average and distribution of education, the estimated coeﬃcient of the average years of
schooling is never statistically signiﬁcant.
8The source of these variables is the PWT 6.1 by Heston, Summers and Aten (2002) for the log of per capita
income, the log of the investment rate and the level of population. The urbanization rate, ethnic fractionalization
and the infant mortality rate are taken from the Global Development Growth Data Base compiled by Easterly and
Sewadeh (2002). Life expectancy source is the World Development Indicators 2004 and the percentage of Muslims
in the total population is taken from La Porta et al. (1999).
8results of the previous section are not due to the omission of relevant variables related to education
and democracy.
Acemoglu et al. (2005) have suggested that the country-ﬁxed eﬀects could be capturing omit-
ted factors that have inﬂuenced the joint evolution of economic and political development. In fact,
Acemoglu et al. (2004) ﬁnd that the country ﬁxed-eﬀects, estimated from the relationship between
income and democracy, are highly related to historical variables that characterized earlier institu-
tions. If these variables are driving the positive inﬂuence of the education attained by the majority
of the society on democracy, we should ﬁnd that once we control for these variables the positive
eﬀect vanishes. The lower part of Table 4 displays the results when historical and endowment vari-
ables, which are time invariant, are controlled for. Given that the time invariant variables enter as
proxies of αi, we can estimate equation (1) by OLS. In the ﬁrst place, we include the log of settler
mortality as the ﬁrst time invariant variable since Acemoglu et al. (2001) use mortality faced by
Europeans colonizers as a proxy for early institutions.9 Moreover, geography and endowments
have also been argued to inﬂuence the type of colonization and therefore the previous institutions.
To check the robustness of our results to the eﬀect of geography and endowments on democracy,
we include latitude from the equator and oil exporting countries in the set of explanatory variables.
Finally, we control for the quality of the legal system since, according to La Porta et al. (1998),
it is related to the legal origin. In particular, these authors ﬁnd that the common-law system is
better at protecting property rights. The results show that controlling for historical or endowment
variables, which have been suggested to be related to unobservable omitted ﬁxed eﬀects, does not
change our result. The estimated coeﬃcient of the third quintile is always statistically signiﬁcant
at the 1 per cent level and its value ranges from 0.303 to 0.391. Moreover, it is worth noting that
the estimated value with the system GMM , displayed in column (9), ranges within this interval
(0.350).10 Therefore, the results suggest that our main ﬁnding is not driven by omitted variables
that could have inﬂuenced both the political and economic development of societies.
[Insert Table 4]
IV. III Alternative measures of democracy and education inequality
In the last table we check the robustness of the results to alternative measures of democracy and
diﬀerent indicators of the distribution of education. With regard to the measures of democracy,
Table 5 displays the results with the additional measures of institutions and democracy used
by Glaeser et al. (2004). The broader set of alternative measures of political institutions include
9The interesting idea of Acemoglu et al. (2001) is that in places where Europeans faced high mortality rates, the
settlers implemented extractive states that transferred resources rapidly to the metropolis. This strategy resulted
in bad institutions that did not introduce protection of private property. On the contrary, when settlers faced low
risk of mortality, they stayed in the colony and established European institutions that enforced the rule of law.
Furthermore, the authors ﬁnd evidence that early institutions have persisted to the present.
10Other variables suggested by Acemoglu et al. (2005) as being highly related to the ﬁxed eﬀects in democracy
regressions, such as the density of the indigenous population in 1500, display similar results. In this case the
estimated coeﬃcent for the third quintile is 0.380 and the standard error is 0.065.
9democracy, autocracy and constraints on the executive, from Polity IV and the measure of autocracy
from Przeworski et al. (2000). Both variables take values from 0 to 10, where higher values show a
greater degree of democracy and autocracy respectively. The autocracy variable from Przeworski
ranges from 0 to 2 where higher values indicate a higher level of autocracy. Executive constraint
is a measure of the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision making powers of chief
executives. Its value ranges from 1 to 7, where the greater the value the higher the constraints on
the executive.11 Columns (1)-(4) show that the inﬂuence of the education attained by sixty per
cent of the population on democracy holds when we use diﬀerent variables that measure the degree
of autocracy or democracy in societies. The only exception is when we measure institutions with
the index of democracy from Polity IV. In this case, although the coeﬃcient of the third quintile is
positive, it is not statistically signiﬁcant at the standard levels. However, with additional measures
from Polity IV, such as the Combined Polity Score computed by subtracting the Autocracy score
from the Democracy score, the coeﬃcient of the third quintile remains statistically signiﬁcant.
We also check the robustness of the results to alternative measures of equality in the distribution
of education. The results suggest that the percentage of education attained by the lowest and
middle quintiles is an important determinant of democracy, whereas the percentage of education
attained by the elite is not related to the level of democracy. An aggregate measure of inequality
such as the Gini coeﬃcient is also negatively related to the degree of democracy (column (8)).
Taken together, these ﬁndings reveal that the main result of the paper is not due to a narrow
deﬁnition of democracy or to an inadequate deﬁnition of equality in the distribution of education.
The use of alternative measures of institutions and diﬀerent measures of inequality show that the
distribution of education is an outstanding determinant of democracy.
[Insert Table 5]
I V .I V A t y p i c a lo b s e r v a t i o n s
Finally, we check if the results are inﬂuenced by the presence of atypical observations. In order
to control for outliers, ﬁrstly, we reestimate the regression in column (9) of Table 2 by removing
one country at a time. Then, we remove the 5 countries with the highest average values of the
third quintile and the 12 countries with a value of zero in the third quintile. Finally, we repeat the
exercise by ruling out the countries whose residuals exceed more than three times the estimated
standard error of the residuals. In all cases the coeﬃcient of the third quintile is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, suggesting that the results are unlikely to be driven by outliers.
We have also run a robust regression procedure of column (3) in Table 2, which gets the
Cook´s D values and then drops any observation if its Cook´s D value is greater than 1. Although
the results show a greater estimated coeﬃcient for lag democracy and lower coeﬃcients for both
educational variables compared to those obtained in column 3, the only educational variable that
has a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on democracy is the third quintile.
11For a more comprehensive deﬁnition of variables see Marshall and Jaggers (2003) and Przeworski et al. (2000).
10VC o n c l u s i o n s
One of the empirical regularities in political economy, which refers to the positive association
between education and democracy, has been challenged recently by the paper of Acemoglu et
al. (2005). These authors point out that previous empirical evidence could suﬀer from potential
omitted variable bias. As a result, when these authors control for country speciﬁc-eﬀects, the
positive association between education and several measures of democracy disappears.
The present paper advocates that the results of Acemoglu et al. (2005) could be due to the
problems inherent to the econometric techniques they use. Although the ﬁxed eﬀects and ﬁrst-
diﬀerence GMM estimators solve the problem of unobservable heterogeneity, these estimators may
not be appropriate in the estimation of a dynamic panel data model with persistent variables.
The exacerbation of the measurement error bias and the problem of weak instruments could cast
doubt over the validity of the results. Improvements in the econometric techniques to estimate a
dynamic panel data model with persistent variables has been made by Arellano and Bover (1995)
and Blundell and Bond (1998). In fact, when this more appropriate econometric technique is used,
the results obtained in this paper are in line with the Lipset´s (1956) hypothesis, which states a
positive association between education and democracy.
In addition, in this paper we go one step further and analyze the hypothesis that it is a
more equal distribution of education that matters for democracy, that is, the implementation and
sustainability of democracies needs the support of the majority of the society. According to this
hypothesis we ﬁnd that the percentage of education attained by sixty per cent of the population
seems to be a very important determinant of democracies. We ﬁnd the empirical regularity that a
more equal distribution of education is strongly related to a higher level of democracy. This result
holds not only in the long term across countries but also in the short term within a country, as
suggested by the estimation of a dynamic panel data model that does control for country speciﬁc
eﬀects.
The quite robust eﬀect of the distribution of education on democracy found in this paper
suggests that future theoretical and empirical research should pay more attention to the education
attained by the median voter as a potential determinant of the degree of democracy. In particular,
the novelty of the results and the lack of formalization of the Lipset´s views breaks new grounds
for further theoretical work.
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13Table 1
Democracy and Education
Adjusted R2 from regressions on country and time dummies
Dependent variable Country dummies Time dummies Country and time dummies
Education 0.855 0.066 0.968
Democracy 0.654 0.014 0.685
Countries 104
Observations 764
Note: Pooled OLS estimation. Democracy is measured through the political rights index and Education
is the average years of education of the population 25 years and over.Table 2
Democracy and Education.
Pooled OLS First-Dif GMM System GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Democracyt−5 0.698a 0.698a 0.686a 0.555a 0.533a 0.530a 0.647a 0.658a 0.652a
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.084) (0.076) (0.077) (0.062) (0.060) (0.060)
Average Educt−5 0.023a 0.009b -0.016 0.007 0.022a 0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.033) (0.23) (0.006) (0.009)
3rd Quintile Educt−5 0.352a 0.251a 0.005 0.048 0.469a 0.350a
(0.050) (0.072) (0.252) (0.188) (0.142) (0.132)
Constant 0.092a 0.122a 0.110a 0.135a 0.115b 0.132a
(0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.036) (0.045) (0.035)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R2 0.71 0.72 0.72
Countries 104 104 104 102 102 102 104 104 104
Obs 764 764 764 659 659 659 764 764 764
Period 1960-20001960-20001960-2000 1965-20001965-20001965-2000 1965-20001965-2000 1965-2000
AR (2) test [0.652] [0.649] [0.665] [0.754] [0.841] [0.814]
Hansen J test [0.091] [0.354] [0.185] [0.102] [0.034] [0.190]
Diﬀerence Hansen [0.371] [0.004] [0.382]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively.
Democracy is measured through the political rights index. Education includes the average years of schooling of the
population 25 years and over and the percentage of education attained by the sixty per cent of the population. The
instruments for columns (4)-(6) are the levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and further lags until a
maximum of 5. In addition to these variables, the system-GMM also uses as instruments for the level equations the
explanatory variables in ﬁrst diﬀerences lagged one period.Table 3
Democracy and Education: Diﬀerent Samples.
System GMM estimator. Dependent Variable is Democracy
Developing countries Developed countries Base Sample without
Oil Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Democracyt−5 0.602a 0.591a 0.585a 0.600a 0.614a 0.605a 0.619a 0.640a 0.634a
(0.060) (0.068) (0.066) (0.105) (0.081) (0.099) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068)
Average Educt−5 0.018c -0.011 0.011 0.005 0.022a 0.001
(0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009)
3rd Quintile Educt−5 0.493a 0.521a 0.241b 0.153b 0.461a 0.385a
(0.127) (0.147) (0.112) (0.073) (0.150) (0.139)
Constant 0.177a 0.152a 0.196a 0.296a 0.273a 0.279a 0.165a 0.137a 0.158a
(0.044) (0.043) (0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.052) (0.036) (0.048) (0.037)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Countries 69 69 69 23 23 23 92 92 92
Obs 505 505 505 179 179 179 676 676 676
Period 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000
AR (2) test [0.699] [0.756] [0.745] [0.572] [0.595] [0.594] [0.692] [0.770] [0.752]
Hansen J test [0.335] [0.303] [0.970] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.067] [0.063] [0.367]
Diﬀerence Hansen [0.533] [0.109] [1.000] [0.991] [1.000] [1.000] [0.082] [0.319] [0.609]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively. Democracy
is measured through the political rights index. Education includes the average years of schooling of the population 25
years and over and the percentage of education attained by the sixty per cent of the population. The instruments are the
levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and all further lags until a maximum of 5 as well as the variables
in ﬁrst diﬀerences lagged one period.Table 4
Democracy and Education: Additional Explanatory Variables
System GMM estimator. Dependent Variable is Democracy
Electoral rights Civil liberties
AR (2) test AR (2) test
Aditional controls 3rd Quintile Educt−5 Hansen, Diﬀ Hansen 3rd Quintile Educt−5 Hansen, Diﬀ Hansen
lnyt−5 0.342b [0.76] 0.220b [0.45]
(0.159) [0.26, 0.84] (0.107) [0.31, 0.82]
lnskt−5 0.625a [0.70] 0.461a [0.43]
(0.126) [0.23, 0.67] (0.087) [0.35, 0.46]
Urbanization Ratet−5 0.397a [0.82] 0.288a [0.19]
(0.123) [0.16, 0.17] (0.081) [0.32, 0.50]
Populationt−5 0.308b [0.64] 0.325a [0.36]
(0.123) [0.27, 0.94] (0.088) [0.36, 0.63]
Life Expectancyt−5 0.324a [0.73] 0.359a [0.16]
(0.094) [0.20, 0.32] (0.064) [0.23, 0.45]
Infant Mortalityt−5 0.455a [0.80] 0.352a [0.16]
(0.129) [0.14, 0.20] (0.091) [0.28, 0.78]
Education gapt−5 0.274a [0.79] 0.168b [0.17]
(0.095) [0.26, 0.57] (0.078) [0.30, 0.52]
Ethnolinguistict−5 0.418a [0.75] 0.371a [0.38]
(0.131) [0.16] (0.100) [0.18]
Muslimst−5 0.427b [0.83] 0.323b [0.18]
(0.165) [0.09] (0.140) [0.08]
Endowments and historical variables. OLS estimator. Dependent Variable is Democracy
Obsevations Obsevations
3rd Quintile Educt−5 R2 3rd Quintile Educt−5 R2
ln Settler Mortality 0.391a 386 0.341a 386
(0.078) [0.60] (0.060) [0.65]
Latitude 0.347a 748 0.303a 748
(0.051) [0.72] (0.040) [0.77]
Oil 0.347a 764 0.306a 764
(0.050) [0.72] (0.039) [0.77]
Common-law 0.352a 764 0.308a 764
(0.050) [0.72] (0.038) [0.77]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level
respectively. Democracy is measured through the political rights and the civil liberties indixes. The
estimated coeﬃcients shown are those of the 3rd quintile in the distribution of education. The deﬁnition
of the remaining controls is in the text.Table 5
Democracy and Education
Alternative mesures of democracy and the distribution of education. System-GMM
Polity IV Przeworski et al.
Democracy Autocracy Exe. Cons. Autocracy Electoral Rights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracyt−5 0.803a 0.668a 0.676a 0.364a 0.632a 0.602a 0.686a 0.631a
(0.054) (0.080) (0.067) (0.095) (0.062) (0.061) (0.059) (0.058)
Average Educt−5 0.021 0.156 0.001 -0.018 0.009 0.001 0.019c -0.011
(0.116) (0.110) (0.080) (0.034) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012)
3rd Quintile Educt−5 2.089 -4.545b 2.280c -1.272a
(1.929) (1.910) (1.260) (0.475)
1st Quintile Educt−5 1.102a
(0.356)
2nd Quintile Educt−5 0.723a
(0.242)




Constant 0.593c 0.921c 1.072a 0.868a 0.174a 0.185a 0.176c 0.535a
(0.343) (0.492) (0.291) (0.157) (0.039) (0.040) (0.094) (0.122)
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Countries 102 102 102 99 104 104 104 104
Obs 713 713 713 513 764 764 764 764
Period 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000 1965-2000
AR (2) test [0.239] [0.439] [0.275] [0.129] [0.739] [0.688] [0.803] [0.795]
Hansen J test [0.260] [0.162] [0.189] [0.262] [0.272] [0.268] [0.162] [0.152]
Diﬀerence Hansen [0.183] [0.693] [0.094] [0.362] [0.582] [0.414] [0.284] [0.041]
Note: Robust standard errors in parenthesis. a, b and c are 1, 5 and 10 per cent signiﬁcance level respectively. The instruments
are the levels of the explanatory variables lagged two periods and all further lags until a maximum of 5 as well as the variables
in ﬁrst diﬀerences lagged one period.